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Abstract. A longstanding question in the study of energy demand concerns the role
of information as a determinant of home-efficiency improvements. Although the pro-
vision of information via home energy audits is frequently asserted to be an effective
means for governments to encourage the implementation of efficiency-enhancing ren-
ovations, empirical support for this assertion is tenuous at best. Two factors have com-
plicated attempts to measure the effect of audits: first, the nature of the information
provided by the audit is typically unobserved, and, second, the response to this in-
formation may vary over households. Using household-level data from Germany, we
address both sources of heterogeneity by estimating a random-parameter model of four
retrofitting alternatives. In addition to confirming the importance of costs and savings
as determinants of renovation choices, our results suggest that the effects of consultancy
vary substantially across households, with some households responding negatively to
the provision of information.
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1 Introduction
Increasing efficiency through home renovation is generally asserted to be a highly ef-
fective means for households to lower expenditures on energy. From a public policy
perspective, increasing efficiency has the additional benefit of reducing reliance on fos-
sil fuels, thereby contributing to both energy security and environmental stewardship.
Despite potentially high energy savings, however, it is frequently observed that home-
owners refrain from undertaking cost-intensive renovations, such as investing in new
windows with a better insulation.
This observation has led to a controversial discussion about what causes the so-
called energy efficiency gap (see e.g. STERN, 1986, JAFFE and STAVINS, 1994). Usually,
such behavior is attributed to a poor understanding or lack of information about reno-
vation options and the associated costs and benefits (GOLOVE and ETO, 1996, SCOTT,
1997). In response, many countries have introduced free or low-cost energy conser-
vation audits with the aim of assisting consumers in making well-founded decisions
regarding the retrofitting of their homes.
The theoretical literature is generally unambiguous about the effect of such au-
dits: more information enables households to assess the renovation options adequately
and thus leads to a higher likelihood of efficiency investments (SORRELL, 2006). Nev-
ertheless, empirical support for this view is weak. For example, in an early study,
MCDOUGALL et al. (1983) analyze the Canadian residential home audit program
’Ener$ave’ and conclude that audits have nearly no effect on residential investment
behavior. HIRST and GOELTZ (1985) consider a U. S. residential weatherization pro-
gram and find likewise no effect of audits, and only a weak influence if the audits are
offered together with loans. More recently, SCHLEICH (2004) examines whether energy
audits can overcome certain investment barriers in the German commerce and service
sector. His results imply that audits help to inform about the own energy consumption
structure, but have little effect in reducing a perceived information deficit.
A possible explanation for the disparity between the theoretical and empirical
findings is offered by JAFFE and STAVINS (1994), who, among other reasons, attribute
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it to inertia in consumer adoption behavior. With particular respect to energy audits,
this means that an objectively conducted audit may in fact result in a decision against
retrofitting. This possibility has also been suggested by METCALF and HASSETT (1999),
who speculate that consumers receive coaching from auditors on how to save energy
through behavioral changes, which may lead them to conclude that investments are
not necessary. If an audit affects an investment decision in both directions, an empirical
consequence could be non-significant average effects.
The principal aim of the present paper is to contribute to this line of inquiry by
developing a theoretical model focusing on the role of information in influencing de-
cisions about retrofitting. Our model illustrates why this role is ambiguous: When
the returns from the retrofitting investment are uncertain, the provision of information
may offset the negative expectations of skeptics and thereby increase the likelihood of
the investment, but it may also disabuse optimists of their positive expectation and
decrease the likelihood. To illustrate this issue, we draw on a unique data set from
Germany that combines household, engineering, and GIS-based regional information
for analyzing how consumers respond to home energy audits. We apply a mixed logit
model, which is highly flexible and can approximate any random-utility model (MC
FADDEN and TRAIN, 2000), to allow for the possibility that the effects of an audit on
the choice among a variety of renovation options may vary across households and be
either positive or negative.
In addition to confirming the importance of costs and savings as determinants of
renovation choices, our results suggest that the effects of an audit vary substantially
across consumers. Specifically, while the mean effect of an audit is positive, the distri-
bution of its respective coefficient exhibits substantial variability, with the provision of
information having a negative effect for some households. We conclude that the mixed
logit model reveals important information about behavioral heterogeneity that would
otherwise be neglected, particularly with the application of a standard logit model.
The subsequent section presents a theoretical model of the impact of information.
Section 3 describes the empirical modeling approach, followed by an explication of the
data assembly in Section 4. Section 5 presents an empirical illustration, while the last
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section summarizes and concludes.
2 Modeling the Impact of Information
Using the example of renovation decisions of homeowners, we present here a stylized
two-step model that aims at clarifying the general question as to whether information
provision, for instance by audits, may enhance participation in energy conservation
programs or may trigger renovation activities. To simplify matters, we focus on a sin-
gle renovation option such as fac¸ade insulation. On the basis of imperfect information
about both investment costs as well as energy and cost savings resulting from renova-
tion, homeowner i builds expectations E(Vi) on its individual present value Vi, which
is assumed to be random and to depend on i’s time preference rate ρi, the vector of in-
dividual and home characteristics xi and uncertain net revenues Rt(xi) resulting from
unknown energy savings in period t and annualized investment cost:
(1) Vi =
T
∑
t=0
Uit(Rt(xi)) · (1+ ρi)
−t = E(Vi) + εi,
whereUit reflects i’s ideosyncratic utility. i’s uncertainty about net revenues Rt(xi) and,
hence, the net present value Vi of renovating is captured here by a random disturbance
εi. Most notably, this term reflects unknown future energy prices, being crucial param-
eters for the profitability of any renovation measure.
Assuming risk neutrality, homeowner i might be inclined to renovate if the ex-
pected benefit E(Vi) of renovation appears to be positive:
(2) E(Vi) =
∞∫
−∞
Vi f (Vi)dVi > 0,
where f (Vi) designates a density function. Given i’s imperfect a-priori information,
however, there is scope for mistakes. Therefore, any homeowner i may wish to ideally
receive perfect information on the energy conservation measure and the incurred cost
so that, formally speaking, i is able to observe εi and anticipate whether the net present
value Vi will be positive indeed.
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Figure 1: A Two-Step Information Acquisition and Renovation Decision Model
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Homeownersmay gather the desired information either on their own or by engag-
ing in energy conservation audits, where the information cost are frequently reduced
through subsidization. Either way, we assume that gathering information is costly and,
just for didactic purposes, that uncertainty may at least be reduced insofar as i is then
informed whether Vi is positive: Vi > 0. Only in this case will homeowner i actually
renovate.
In the first step of our model, homeowner i decides upon information acquisition,
e. g. through an audit. At the second stage, i decides on whether to renovate. With-
out any loss of generality, it is assumed that acquiring information on the renovation
option, and hence incurring information cost, is an indispensable prerequisite for any
renovation activity. This simplification of the model implies that the decision tree is
asymmetric (Figure 1).
A rational homeowner iwill incur the generally well-determined information cost
ICi only if the expected benefit E(Bi) of acquiring information exceeds the cost:
(3) E(Bi) > ICi > 0.
The expected benefit E(Bi) of information results from either the positive renova-
tion outcome that a priori has been expected (E(Vi) > 0) or from avoiding mistakes. A
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first type of mistake – from an ex-post perspective – results from the fact that although
i expected a non-positive renovation outcome, E(Vi) ≤ 0, i should have renovated if
Vi > 0. If i is able to avoid this kind of mistake through information acquisition, the
conditional expected benefit is positive: E(Bi|Vi > 0) =
∞∫
0
Vi f (Vi)dVi > 0. In this case,
in which i had negative expectations E(Vi) < 0, the unconditional expected benefit
E(Bi) from information acquisition is given by
E(Bi) = P(Vi > 0) · E(Bi|Vi > 0) + P(Vi ≤ 0) · E(Bi |Vi ≤ 0)
= P(Vi > 0) · E(Bi|Vi > 0) + P(Vi ≤ 0) · 0 = P(Vi > 0) ·
∞∫
0
Vi f (Vi)dVi,(4)
with a vanishing conditional expected benefit E(Bi|Vi ≤ 0) = 0 in case that the non-
positive expectation E(Vi) ≤ 0 is confirmed.
A second type of mistake is that, although i expected a positive outcome E(Vi) >
0, i should have not renovated if, ultimately, it turned out that Vi < 0. If i is able to
avoid this kind of mistake, the conditional expected benefit of information is positive:
E(Bi|Vi ≤ 0) = −
0∫
−∞
Vi f (Vi)dVi > 0. Overall, the unconditional expected benefit E(Bi)
from information acquisition in the case of positive expectations E(Vi) > 0 reads as
follows:
(5) E(Bi) = P(Vi ≤ 0) · [−
0∫
−∞
Vi f (Vi)dVi] + P(Vi > 0) ·
∞∫
0
Vi f (Vi) dVi.
Note that the second part of this expression is non-vanishing because of our assumption
that acquiring information is indispensable for renovation activities.
While formulae (4) and (5), and condition E(Bi) > ICi rationalize the decision
on acquiring information, Figure 2 illustrates that information measures do not nec-
essarily foster conservation activities. This holds true for those who expect a positive
net present value, E(V2) > 0, but then must realize that an investment is actually not
advantageous, i. e. V2 ≤ 0, and thus refrain from any renovation activities. This situa-
tion is illustrated in Figure 2 by the dotted part of the right-hand distribution centered
around the positive expectation E(V2).
Such negative impacts of information measures on renovation activities might be
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Figure 2: Expectations E(Vi) and Actual Renovation Outcomes Vi
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outweighed through the unexpected activities of skeptics, who a priori expect a neg-
ative net present value, yet have mild hopes that conservation measures might turn
out to be positive and thus are open-minded to information measures such as audits.
This case is illustrated in Figure 2 by the highlighted part of the left-hand distribution
centered around the negative expected value E(V1) < 0. In this case, information mea-
sures would positively affect renovation investments, yet not by providing additional
incentives, but by convincing skeptics that conservation would be a success. Overall,
though, it clearly remains a matter of the particular conservation measure and the con-
crete conditions and incentives, in other words an empirical issue, in which direction
information measures, such as audits, affect an investment decision.
The basic role of information provision by audits is that it may lower individual
information cost ICi and, in the end, may favor conservation by increasing the num-
ber of potential investors. Much more important than information measures, however,
should be incentives that substantially increase the attractiveness of conservation in-
vestments, as is illustrated in Figure 3 by the right-hand side distribution with a large
positive expected net present value E(V2). In the extreme case that the uncertainty re-
flected by ε2 is negligible compared to E(V2), information measures should not have
any impact on renovation decisions at all. In sum, while information measures, such
as audits, do not necessarily spur renovation activities or participation in conservation
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Figure 3: Investments with Low and High Conservation Benefits
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programs, they are to be embraced from an individual welfare perspective. After all,
information measures may help to avoid mistakes, as the two-step decision model pre-
sented in this section has demonstrated. From this perspective, the question arises as
to whether information measures, such as audits, should be publicly subsidized, rather
than being afforded privately (see FRONDEL, GRO¨SCHE, SCHMIDT, 2008).
3 Data Description
Our data is drawn from a sample of 2,530 single-family home owners, surveyed in
2005 as part of the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS). From
this survey, it is known whether household i participated in an audit – captured by
a binary variable audit – and what retrofit measure was implemented within the last
10 years, if any. Four different retrofit measures have been surveyed: roof insulation
(j = 1), fac¸ade insulation (j = 2), windows replacement (j = 3), and replacement of
heating equipment (j = 4). The information on the retrofit measures is captured each
with a separate binary response variable rij, yielding four entries for each household i
on its retrofit choices j. In total, 64% of the households undertook at least one of these
four retrofit measures between 1995 and 2005.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
audit Dummy: 1 if household received an audit 0.12 –
cost Cost of renovation option in 1,000 e 7.72 4.86
savings Annual energy savings in 1,000 kWh 5.01 4.59
consumption Annual energy consumption in 1,000 kWh 31.48 14.65
age Age of the single-family house in years 43.01 42.49
income Net monthly household income in 1,000 e 2.23 1.04
east Dummy: 1 if house is located in Eastern Germany 0.16 –
degree Dummy: 1 if household head has a university degree 0.24 –
Most of the remaining variables were elicited directly via the questionnaire, the
descriptive statistics for which are presented in Table 1. These variables include the age
of the house, household income and energy consumption for the year 2003, a dummy
indicating whether the household head has a university degree, and a dummy indi-
cating location in Eastern Germany. 402 of the 2,530 sample households, that is around
16%, originate from Eastern Germany and 293 households received an audit, represent-
ing a share of 11,6%. In addition to socio-economic and dwelling characteristics, the
data includes a location identifier measured at the municipal level for each household.
The data is completed by information on the investment cost for each retrofit op-
tion, the resulting household-specific energy savings, and a suite of variables describ-
ing the home itself and the socioeconomic characteristics of its occupants. Estimates of
energy savings following a retrofit are based on engineering calculations. Investment
cost estimates draw on cost values of actual retrofit projects published by the German
Architectural Association. We have refined these figures by controlling for regional
wage differences for craftsmen. Details on the data assembly for energy savings and
investment cost are given by GRO¨SCHE and VANCE (2009).
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4 Methodology
While investment cost of retrofitting options and the resulting energy savings are cer-
tainly two key determinants of renovation decisions, the net benefit of any renovation
option is difficult to anticipate for households because of numerous uncertainties, in-
cluding unknown future energy prices that may undermine the profitability of a ren-
ovation. Furthermore, households may face information deficits about the variety of
retrofitting alternatives. Not least, even if all alternatives are known, the calculation of
energy savings is likely to go beyond the capabilities of the majority of households.
By informing about the variety of retrofitting options, the associated costs, and the
energy savings to be expected, energy audits may provide for valuable information that
is highly relevant for the decision of households. As demonstrated by the theoretical
model presented in the previous section, it is an open question, however, as to whether
the information provided by audits increases the likelihood of undertaking a renova-
tion. Moreover, there might exist unobservable factors that affect the households’ deci-
sion, such as aspects often referred to as “hidden costs”. For example, a household may
eschew the noise and dirt that accompany some retrofit measures. Such factors, which
are typically unobservable may vary the effect of observable factors such as audit.
To account for both the potentially varying effect of an audit on household i’s
retrofit decisions and the inherent dependency among the J = 4 renovation decisions
of household i, we employ a logit model with mixed effects, frequently called mixed
logit, random-parameters, or random-coefficients logit (REVELT and TRAIN, 1998:647).
For brevity, we use here the term mixed logit, even though our model specification
is motivated through a random-coefficients concept. This model generalization over-
comes the three limitations of standard logit models by allowing for (1) unrestricted
substitution patterns, (2) correlation in unobserved factors over repeated choices, and
(3) correlation of unobserved and observed factors commonly described by the notion
of random-taste variation (TRAIN, 2003:46). Of course, decision-makers’ tastes or pref-
erences also vary for reasons that are not linked to observed individual characteris-
tics and attributes of the alternatives. That is, two household heads with the same in-
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come, education, etc. will make different choices, reflecting their individual preferences
(TRAIN, 2003:47).
Closely following the illuminating introduction given by TRAIN (2003), mixed
logit models can be defined on the basis of the functional form for the probabilities Pij
of household i’s choices among the alternatives j = 1, ..., J:
(6) Pij =
∫
(
exp(βTxij)
∑k exp(β
Txik)
) f (β)dβ,
where
(7) Lij(β) :=
exp(βTxij)
∑k exp(β
Txik)
is the well-known formula for the conditional logit probability evaluated at β, with xij
designating the observable factors and f (β) being a density function. In other words,
the mixed logit probability given by (6) is a weighted average of the conditional logit
formula evaluated at different values of β, with the weights being given by density
f (β).1 The mixed logit model degenerates to the conditional logit model for the special
case in which f (β) = 1 for β = b and zero otherwise. In this special case, choice
probability (6) coincides with the logit formula given by (7), when β is replaced by b.
In line with random-utility theory, the mixed logit probability (6) can be derived
from utility-maximizing behavior, with the utility Uij of household i from alternative j
being specified as follows:
(8) Uij = β
T
i xij + ǫij.
Vector xij captures both alternative-specific attributes, such as investment cost, and
household-specific characteristics, such as income, while ǫij represents the portion of
utility that is unobservable to the researcher and often referred to as “unobserved het-
erogeneity”.2 βi is an unobservable vector of coefficients that represents household i’s
preferences and, hence, generally varies over households.
1In the statistics literature, the weighted average of distinct functions is called amixed function, which
explains the name of the mixed logit model, while the density that provides for the weights is called the
mixing distribution.
2For both the standard and the mixed logit, the error terms are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed, obeying a Gumbel or Type I extreme value distribution with F(ǫ) = e−e
−ǫ
being
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Therefore, the researcher cannot condition on βi and cannot calculate the proba-
bility conditional on βi that would be given by the conditional logit formula (7). Rather,
the researcher is forced to assume that βi is a random variable with density f (β), so
that solely the unconditional choice probability resulting from the integral given by (6)
can be computed, generally through simulation. Note that the researcher has to spec-
ify the distribution of βi and, hence, density f (β), with the normal or the lognormal
distribution being selected in most applications, such as REVELT and TRAIN (1998:647):
β ∼ N(b,W) or log β ∼ N(b,W), where the moments b and W of the distribution of
the household-specific coefficients βi are to be estimated.
As a formally equivalent alternative to the random-coefficients interpretation, a
mixed logit model can be derived from a utility representation that allows for an error
component interpretation:
(9) Uij = β
Txij + ∆
T
i zij + ǫij,
where the unobserved utility portion ηij := ∆
T
i zij + ǫij consists of two error compo-
nents, with the first component creating correlations among alternatives:
Cov(ηij, ηik) = E(∆
T
i zij + ǫij)(∆
T
i zik + ǫik) = z
T
ijWzik,
where W = E(∆i∆
T
i ) is the covariance matrix of ∆i that generally differs from 0. It
bears noting that utility is correlated over alternatives even when error components are
assumed to be independent, such thatW is diagonal.
It is instructive to demonstrate that the random-coefficients and the error com-
ponents specification (8) and (9) of utility are formally equivalent. First, when decom-
posing the coefficients βi into their mean β and respective deviations ∆i := βi − β,
the error components specification (9) follows from the random-coefficients specifica-
tion (8) by replacing βi through β+ ∆i: Uij = β
Txij + ∆
T
i xij + ǫij, with the zij from the
random-coefficients representation (9) being equal to xij. Conversely, under an error
components motivation, utility is given byUij = β
Txij+∆
T
i zij+ ǫij (see expression (9)),
the cumulative distribution function. Differences ǫ∗ijk := ǫij − ǫik of two error terms then follow the
logistic distribution: F(ǫ∗ijk) =
exp(ǫ∗ijk)
1+exp(ǫ∗ijk)
.
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which is equivalent to a random-coefficients model with fixed coefficients for variables
xij and random coefficients with zero means for variables zij.
3
Along the lines of this methodological discussion, we specify the probability for
the binary choice that household i chooses retrofit response rij as follows:
P(rij = 1) = α+ ζi + x
T
ijβ+ (δ+ ψi) · auditi + εij
= α+ xTijβ+ δ · auditi + ζi + ψi · auditi + εij︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηij
,(10)
where household- and option-specific characteristics are captured by vector xij. ζi and
ψi denote random deviations from the intercept and the mean effect of home audits on
retrofit decisions, respectively, and are assumed to be normally distributed with zero
mean and covariance matrix
(11) Σ =

 Var(ζi) Cov(ζi ,ψi)
Cov(ζi ,ψi) Var(ψi)

 .
Various covariance structures can be specified, the most flexible of which allows unique
variances and covariances. Restrictions can also be introduced, such as by imposing a
single variance and constraining the covariances to zero.
The residuals εi are assumed to be uncorrelated with ζi and ψi and, as with the
standard logit model, are independently and identically distributed type I extreme
value with variance π2/6. The composed error term ηij = ζi + ψi · auditi + εij allows
for correlation among any two response probabilities P(rij = 1) and P(rik = 1) for the
same individual i, thereby controlling for the inherent dependency among the individ-
uals’ four response options.
5 Empirical Illustration
The primary goal of our empirical illustration is to explore the extent of heterogeneity
in household responsiveness to home audits. To this end, we conceive of the decision
3If xij and zij overlap, that is, some of the variables enter both vectors, x and z, the coefficients of
these variables can be considered to vary randomly with mean β and the same distribution as around
their mean.
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tree depicted in Figure 1 as involving two sequential and independent steps, whereby
the household first decides to gather information, e. g. via an audit, and subsequently
chooses which, if any, renovation options to undertake. We thereby assume that the
audit dummy is exogenous. It is, of course, likely that the decision to undertake an
audit is endogenous, an issue to which we return in the discussion of the results.
Table 2 compares estimates from both a standard logit model in which the coeffi-
cients are fixed without exception, and a mixed logit model in which the coefficient on
audit is treated as a random parameter obeying a normal distribution. Turning first to
the dummy variable audit, the coefficient estimate is seen to be positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level in the standard logit model. Interpretation is facilitated by
exponentiating the coefficient to yield the odds ratio. As seen in column two, the odds
of undertaking a renovation are 1.67 times higher for households that have received an
audit relative to those without any such information measure.
Table 2: Estimation Results for the Decision on Renovation.
Standard Logit Mixed Logit
Coeff.s Std. Errors Odds Ratios Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
audit ∗∗ 0.513 (0.092) ∗∗ 1.669 (0.154) ∗∗ 0.730 (0.130)
cost ∗∗-0.108 (0.017) ∗∗ 0.898 (0.016) ∗∗-0.084 (0.015)
savings ∗∗ 0.185 (0.013) ∗∗ 1.204 (0.016) ∗∗ 0.152 (0.012)
consumption 0.002 (0.002) 0.998 (0.002) 0.0001 (0.003)
age ∗∗0.010 (0.001) ∗∗ 1.010 (0.001) ∗∗ 0.016 (0.001)
east ∗∗0.326 (0.089) ∗∗ 1.386 (0.123) ∗∗ 0.464 (0.115)
income 0.042 (0.030) 0.960 (0.029) -0.060 (0.040)
window ∗∗0.841 (0.084) ∗∗ 2.319 (0.196) ∗∗ 0.979 (0.103)
facade ∗∗-1.066 (0.071) ∗∗ 0.344 (0.025) ∗∗-1.296 (0.088)
heating ∗∗ 0.580 (0.129) ∗∗ 1.785 (0.230) ∗∗ 0.924 (0.141)
constant ∗∗-1.414 (0.166) – – ∗∗-2.120 (0.194)
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Observations used for estimation: 10,120. Number of households: 2,530.
All of the remaining coefficients have signs consistent with intuition and, with the
exception of income and energy consumption, are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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The cost of the renovation decreases the likelihood that it is undertaken, while the ex-
pected energy savings and the age of the home both increase it. Likewise, residence
in East Germany, where the housing stock is generally more dilapidated, increases the
likelihood of a renovation. As reflected by the coefficients on the option-specific con-
stants, retrofitting of the roof and facade tend to be more onerous undertakings in terms
of the cost and grime incurred than window and heating retrofits, so that these renova-
tion options both have higher likelihoods.
Column 3 presents the results from a mixed logit model in which the coefficient
on audit is allowed to vary over households. Several variants of the mixed logit model
were explored using different covariance structures. When estimated with the most
flexible structure having unique variances and covariances, the model failed to con-
verge. As an alternative, we specified a structure that imposes a common variance and
allows for a non-zero correlation. Based on a likelihood ratio test, this structure proved
a better fit than one that imposes a common variance and zero covariance. Moreover,
the chi-square statistic obtained from a likelihood ratio test with which the mixed logit
is compared to the standard logit is χ(2) = 521, suggesting that the mixed logit pro-
vides a significantly better fit to the data. The estimated mean effect of the distribution
of the coefficient on audit, at 0.73, is somewhat higher than in the standard logit model.
Moreover, the highly precise estimate of 1.39 of
√
Var(ζi) =
√
Var(ψi) suggests the ex-
istence of significant heterogeneity in the responsiveness of households to information.
Further insight into this result can be gleaned from the distribution of the indi-
vidual slope coefficients on audit. These estimates range from -0.65 to 2.23, suggesting
that for a small share of the households – about 4% – the effect of the audit is nega-
tive. This finding is consistent with our theoretical conjecture presented in Section 2
that information provision can, in some cases, lead the household to decide against
undertaking a renovation. As METCALF and HASSETT (1999:517) note, this outcome
is conceivable if, for example, the household receives coaching from the auditor about
cheaper alternatives than retrofitting for saving energy.
An important qualification in interpreting these findings is the possibility that the
coefficient estimate on audit is biased because of endogeneity. It may be that those
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households who are seriously considering a renovation are also more likely to seek an
audit, which would impart a positive bias via the positive correlation between the error
term of the model and audit. In the absence of instruments to correct for this simultane-
ity, we cannot rule out the possibility that the expected value on the coefficient on audit
is less than our estimate. This would in turn imply that the estimated 4% of households
for whom the impact is negative can be regarded as a lower bound estimate.
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has addressed the question of how the provision of information bears upon
renovation decisions in the German residential sector, which is seen seen as a corner-
stone in the country’s efforts to combat climate change via improvements in energy
efficiency. Using an expected utility framework, we began with a theoretical model
of the decision to renovate that assumes that homeowners are equipped with imper-
fect information about the associated benefits and costs. Under these circumstances,
home audits can serve to avoid two types of mistakes: They may encourage skeptics
who have negative expectations about the net benefits to renovate when the realized
net benefit is positive. Conversely, they may discourage optimists who have positive
expectations about the net benefits to refrain from renovating when the realized net
benefit is negative. The overall effect of the audit on the likelihood of a renovation is
thus ambiguous.
This ambiguity was reflected in the results from an empirical illustration that ex-
plored the impact of home audits on the probability of undertaking a renovation among
a sample of 2,530 single-family homeowners in Germany. To capture response hetero-
geneity, we applied the mixed logit model, which generalizes standard logit models
for analyzing multinomial choices by allowing the parameter associated with observed
variables, e. g. its coefficient, to vary randomly across observation units such as house-
holds (REVELT and TRAIN, 1998:647). Our estimates suggested substantial heterogene-
ity in how homeowners respond to audits, with roughly 4% of households exhibiting a
negative response.
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While we have abstracted from the question of whether publicly financed audits
are justified for capturing positive externalities from the provision of information, our
results nevertheless suggest that the beneficial impacts for residential efficiency may be
muted. In this regard, it bears noting that the social benefits of the program emerge only
from those retrofits that would not have been undertaken in the absence of the home
audit. This effectively excludes those homeowners who receive an audit from which
they are correctly persuaded not to undertake a renovation (but who clearly enjoy a
private benefit). It also excludes those homeowners who would have undertaken the
renovation irrespective of the audit.
According to work by FRONDEL, GRO¨SCHE, and SCHMIDT (2008), the share of
such homeowners may be substantial: for a range of renovation types, these authors
find that far less than half of those households who participated in an audit reported it
to be a decisive factor in their decision to renovate, with shares varying from 11% for the
insulation of the basement ceiling to 34% for the insulation of heating and water pipes.
Looking ahead, we would therefore advocate that the state leave the acquisition of
information to private households and energy-price signals, rather than tapping scarce
public funds to correct an externality whose magnitude is highly questionable.
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